Publications
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Under submission
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), October 2024.
Impossibilities for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shiri Ron
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), January 2024.
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), July 2023.
On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), June 2022
Spotlight Beyond WINE, December 2022
The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), June 2021