News and Activities
  
  
    
  I am currently on the postdoc job market!
	
        
		
        
	
  Publications
	
    
	
	
       On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
 
      
      Conference of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2025), February 2025.
	
      
    
    
	
    
	
	
       Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier 
      
      IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), October 2024. 
	
	  
      
	  
	  
   
   
   
    
	
	
       Impossibilities for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
 
       Shiri Ron 
      ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), January 2024. 
	
      
    
    
   
	
	
    
	
	
       On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings
 
      
      ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), July 2023. 
	
      
    
    
	
	   
    
	
	  
	        
       On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
 
      
      ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), June 2022
	  Spotlight Beyond WINE, December 2022
      
    
    
	
	
	   
    
	  
	        
       The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation
 
      
       ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), June 2021